{"id":7740,"date":"2020-11-14T17:23:41","date_gmt":"2020-11-14T16:23:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/?p=7740"},"modified":"2020-11-14T17:23:42","modified_gmt":"2020-11-14T16:23:42","slug":"il-tuo-computer-non-e-tuo","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/2020\/11\/14\/il-tuo-computer-non-e-tuo\/","title":{"rendered":"Il tuo computer non \u00e8 tuo"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p id=\"nameheader\"><a href=\"https:\/\/sneak.berlin\/\">Jeffrey\u00a0Paul<\/a> ha scritto \u00ab<a href=\"https:\/\/sneak.berlin\/20201112\/your-computer-isnt-yours\/\">Your Computer Isn&#8217;t Yours<\/a>\u00bb esordendo con <\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\"><p>It\u2019s here. It happened. Did you notice? I\u2019m speaking, of course, of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gnu.org\/philosophy\/right-to-read.en.html\">the world that Richard Stallman predicted in 1997<\/a>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Si riferiva a \u00ab<a href=\"https:\/\/www.gnu.org\/philosophy\/right-to-read.it.html\"><strong>Il<\/strong> <strong>diritto<\/strong> a <strong>leggere<\/strong><\/a>\u00bb. Che era un racconto di fantascienza, ma si sta concretizzando molto molto velocemente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h1 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Evitate i prodotti Apple!<\/h1>\n\n\n\n<!--nextpage-->\n\n\n<blockquote>\n<h1 id=\"nameheader\"><a href=\"https:\/\/sneak.berlin\/\">Jeffrey\u00a0Paul<\/a><\/h1>\n<h1>Your Computer Isn&#8217;t Yours <br \/><small>12 November 2020<\/small> <br \/><small> ( 2755 words, approximately 15 minutes reading time. ) <\/small><\/h1>\n<div id=\"blogpagearticlecontent\" class=\"col-md-8\">\n<p><small>Also available in:<\/small><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><small><a href=\"https:\/\/sneak.berlin\/i18n\/2020-11-12-your-computer-isnt-yours.tr\/\">T\u00fcrk\u00e7e<\/a><\/small><\/li>\n<li><small>others: email translations in markdown format to <a href=\"mailto:sneak@sneak.berlin\">sneak@sneak.berlin<\/a><\/small><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>It\u2019s here. It happened. Did you notice?<\/p>\n<p>I\u2019m speaking, of course, of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gnu.org\/philosophy\/right-to-read.en.html\">the world that Richard Stallman predicted in 1997<\/a>. The one <a href=\"https:\/\/craphound.com\/pc\/download\/\">Cory Doctorow also warned us about<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>On modern versions of macOS, you simply can\u2019t power on your computer, launch a text editor or eBook reader, and write or read, without a log of your activity being transmitted and stored.<\/p>\n<p>It turns out that in the current version of the macOS, the OS sends to Apple a hash (unique identifier) of each and every program you run, when you run it. Lots of people didn\u2019t realize this, because it\u2019s silent and invisible and it fails instantly and gracefully when you\u2019re offline, but today the <a href=\"https:\/\/news.ycombinator.com\/item?id=25074959\">server got really slow<\/a> and it didn\u2019t hit the fail-fast code path, and everyone\u2019s apps failed to open if they were connected to the internet.<\/p>\n<p>Because it does this using the internet, the server sees your IP, of course, and knows what time the request came in. An IP address allows for coarse, city-level and ISP-level geolocation, and allows for a table that has the following headings:<\/p>\n<p><code class=\"\" data-line=\"\">Date, Time, Computer, ISP, City, State, Application Hash<\/code><\/p>\n<p>Apple (or anyone else) can, of course, calculate these hashes for common programs: everything in the App Store, the Creative Cloud, Tor Browser, cracking or reverse engineering tools, whatever.<\/p>\n<p>This means that Apple knows when you\u2019re at home. When you\u2019re at work. What apps you open there, and how often. They know when you open Premiere over at a friend\u2019s house on their Wi-Fi, and they know when you open Tor Browser in a hotel on a trip to another city.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWho cares?\u201d I hear you asking.<\/p>\n<p>Well, it\u2019s not just Apple. This information doesn\u2019t stay with them:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>\n<p>These OCSP requests are transmitted <em>unencrypted<\/em>. Everyone who can see the network can see these, including your ISP and <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Room_641A\">anyone who has tapped their cables<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>These requests go to a third-party CDN run by another company, Akamai.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>Since October of 2012, Apple is a partner in <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/PRISM_(surveillance_program)\">the US military intelligence community\u2019s PRISM spying program<\/a>, which grants the US federal police and military unfettered access to this data without a warrant, any time they ask for it. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.apple.com\/legal\/transparency\/\">In the first half of 2019 they did this over 18,000 times, and another 17,500+ times in the second half of 2019.<\/a><\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>This data amounts to a tremendous trove of data about your life and habits, and allows someone possessing all of it to identify your movement and activity patterns. For some people, this can even pose a physical danger to them.<\/p>\n<p>Now, it\u2019s been possible up until today to block this sort of stuff on your Mac using a program called <a href=\"https:\/\/www.obdev.at\/products\/littlesnitch\/index.html\">Little Snitch<\/a> (really, the only thing keeping me using macOS at this point). In the default configuration, it blanket allows all of this computer-to-Apple communication, but you can disable those default rules and go on to approve or deny each of these connections, and your computer will continue to work fine without snitching on you to Apple.<\/p>\n<p>The version of macOS that was released today, 11.0, also known as Big Sur, has new APIs that prevent Little Snitch from working the same way. The new APIs don\u2019t permit Little Snitch to inspect or block any OS level processes. Additionally, the <a href=\"https:\/\/appleterm.com\/2020\/10\/20\/macos-big-sur-firewalls-and-vpns\/\">new rules in macOS 11 even hobble VPNs so that Apple apps will simply bypass them<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/patrickwardle\/status\/1327034191523975168\">@patrickwardle lets us know<\/a> that <code class=\"\" data-line=\"\">trustd<\/code>, the daemon responsible for these requests, is in the new <code class=\"\" data-line=\"\">ContentFilterExclusionList<\/code> in macOS 11, which means it can\u2019t be blocked by any user-controlled firewall or VPN. In his screenshot, it also shows that CommCenter (used for making phone calls from your Mac) and Maps will also leak past your firewall\/VPN, potentially compromising your voice traffic and future\/planned location information.<\/p>\n<p>Those shiny new Apple Silicon macs that Apple just announced, three times faster and 50% more battery life? They won\u2019t run any OS before Big Sur.<\/p>\n<p>These machines are the first general purpose computers ever where you have to make an exclusive choice: you can have a fast and efficient machine, or you can have a private one. (Apple mobile devices have already been this way for several years.) Short of using an external network filtering device like a travel\/vpn router that <em>you<\/em> can totally control, there will be no way to boot any OS on the new Apple Silicon macs that <em>won\u2019t<\/em> phone home, and you can\u2019t modify the OS to prevent this (or they won\u2019t boot at all, due to hardware-based cryptographic protections).<\/p>\n<p><small><strong>Update, 2020-11-13 07:20 UTC:<\/strong> It comes to my attention that it may be possible to disable the boot time protections and modify the Signed System Volume (SSV) on Apple Silicon macs, via the <a href=\"https:\/\/keith.github.io\/xcode-man-pages\/bputil.1.html\">bputil<\/a> tool. I\u2019ve one on order, and I will investigate and report on this blog. As I understand it, this would still only permit booting of Apple-signed macOS, albeit perhaps with certain objectionable system processes removed or disabled. More data forthcoming when I have the system in hand.<\/small><\/p>\n<p>Your computer now serves a remote master, who has decided that they are entitled to spy on you. If you\u2019ve <a href=\"https:\/\/www.apple.com\/macbook-air\/\">the most efficient high-res laptop in the world<\/a>, you <em>can\u2019t turn this off<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s not think very much right now about <a href=\"https:\/\/lapcatsoftware.com\/articles\/revocation.html\">the additional fact that Apple can, via these online certificate checks, prevent you from launching any app they (or their government) demands be censored<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h1 id=\"dear-frog-this-water-is-now-boiling\">Dear Frog, This Water Is Now Boiling<\/h1>\n<p>The day that Stallman and Doctorow have been warning us about has arrived this week. It\u2019s been a slow and gradual process, but we are finally here. You will receive no further alerts.<\/p>\n<h1 id=\"see-also\">See Also<\/h1>\n<ul>\n<li>21 Jan 2020: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive\/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT\">Apple dropped plan for encrypting backups after FBI complained<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h1 id=\"probably-unrelated\">Probably Unrelated<\/h1>\n<p>In other news, Apple has quietly backdoored the end-to-end cryptography of iMessage. Presently, modern iOS will prompt you for your Apple ID during setup, and will automatically enable iCloud and iCloud Backup.<\/p>\n<p>iCloud Backup is not end to end encrypted: it encrypts your device backup to <em>Apple<\/em> keys. Every device with iCloud Backup enabled (it\u2019s on by default) backs up the complete iMessage history to Apple, along with the device\u2019s iMessage secret keys, each night when plugged in. Apple can decrypt and read this information without ever touching the device. Even if <em>you<\/em> have iCloud and\/or iCloud Backup disabled: it\u2019s likely that whoever you\u2019re iMessaging with does not, and that your conversation is being uploaded to Apple (and, via PRISM, freely available to the US military intelligence community, FBI, et al\u2014with no warrant or probable cause).<\/p>\n<p><small><a href=\"https:\/\/signal.org\/\">Use Signal.<\/a><\/small><\/p>\n<h1 id=\"update\">Update<\/h1>\n<p><strong>Update, 2020-11-14 05:10 UTC:<\/strong> There is now a FAQ.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"faq\">FAQ<\/h2>\n<p>Q: <em>Is this part of macOS analytics? Does this still happen if I have analytics off?<\/em><\/p>\n<p>A: This has nothing to do with analytics. It seems this is part of Apple\u2019s anti-malware (and perhaps anti-piracy) efforts, and happens on all macs running the affected versions of the OS, independent of any analytics settings. There is no user setting in the OS to disable this behavior.<\/p>\n<p>Q: <em>When did this start?<\/em><\/p>\n<p>A: This has been happening since at least macOS Catalina (10.15.x, released 7 October 2019). This did not just start with yesterday\u2019s release of Big Sur, it has been happening silently for <em>at least<\/em> a year. <a href=\"https:\/\/lapcatsoftware.com\/articles\/notarization-privacy.html\">According to Jeff Johnson of Lap Cat Software<\/a>, this started with macOS Mojave, which was released on 24 September 2018.<\/p>\n<p>Each new version of macOS that comes out, I install on a blank fresh machine, turn analytics off and log into nothing (no iCloud, no App Store, no FaceTime, no iMessage) and use an external device to monitor all of the network traffic that comes out of the machine. The last few versions of macOS have been quite noisy, even when you don\u2019t use any Apple services. There have been some privacy\/tracking concerns in Mojave (10.14.x), but I don\u2019t recall if this specific OCSP issue existed then or not. I have not yet tested Big Sur (<a href=\"https:\/\/sneak.berlin\/list\">keep in touch for updates<\/a>), and the concerns about user firewalls like Little Snitch and the Apple apps bypassing those and VPNs have come from reports from those who have. I imagine I\u2019ll have a big list of issues I find with Big Sur when I install it on a test machine this week, as it just came out yesterday and I don\u2019t use my limited time testing betas that are in flux, only released software.<\/p>\n<p>Q: <em>How do I protect my privacy?<\/em><\/p>\n<p>A: It varies. There\u2019s a ton of traffic coming out of your mac talking to Apple, and if you\u2019re concerned about your privacy you can start with turning off the things for which there <em>are<\/em> knobs: disable and log out of iCloud, disable and log out of iMessage, disable and log out of FaceTime. Ensure Location Services is off on your computer, iPhone, and iPad. These are the big tracking leaks that you\u2019ve already opted in to, and there is a way out that could not be simpler: turn it off.<\/p>\n<p>As for the OCSP issue, I believe (but have not tested!) that<\/p>\n<p><code class=\"\" data-line=\"\">echo 127.0.0.1 ocsp.apple.com | sudo tee -a \/etc\/hosts<\/code><\/p>\n<p>will work for now for this specific issue. I block such traffic using Little Snitch, which still works correctly on 10.15.x (Catalina) and earlier. (You have to disable all of the Little Snitch default allow rules for \u201cmacOS Services\u201d and \u201ciCloud Services\u201d to get alerts when macOS tries to talk to Apple, because Little Snitch permits them by default.)<\/p>\n<p>If you have an Intel mac (which is pretty much all of you right now), don\u2019t worry too much about OS changes. If you\u2019re willing to get your hands dirty and change some settings, you\u2019ll likely always be able to modify every OS that Apple ever ships for your machine. (This is especially true for slightly older intel macs that do not have the T2 security chip in them, and it\u2019s likely that even T2 Intel macs will always be permitted to disable all boot security (and thus modify the OS) if the user desires, which is the case today.)<\/p>\n<p>The new ARM64 (\u201cApple Silicon\u201d) macs that were released this week are the reason for my sounding the alarm: it remains to be seen whether it will be possible for users to modify the OS on these systems at all. On other Apple ARM systems (iPad, iPhone, Apple TV, Watch) it is cryptographically prohibited to disable parts of the OS. In the default configuration for these new ARM macs, it will likely be prohibited as well, although hopefully users that want the ability will be able to disable some of the security protections and modify the system. I\u2019m hoping that the <a href=\"https:\/\/keith.github.io\/xcode-man-pages\/bputil.1.html\"><code class=\"\" data-line=\"\">bputil(1) utility<\/code><\/a> will permit disabling of the system volume integrity checks on the new macs, allowing us to disable certain system services at boot, without disabling all of the platform security features. More information will be forthcoming when I have the new M1 hardware in hand this month and have the facts.<\/p>\n<p>Q: <em>If you don\u2019t like Apple or don\u2019t trust their OS, why are you running it? Why did you say you\u2019re buying one of the new ARM macs?<\/em><\/p>\n<p>A: The simple answer is that without the hardware and software in hand, I can\u2019t speak authoritatively about what it does or does not do, or steps one might take to mitigate any privacy issues. The long answer is that I have 20+ computers that comprise ~6 different processor architectures and I variously run all of the OSes you\u2019ve heard of and some of the ones you probably haven\u2019t. For example, here in my lab, I have 68k macs (16 bit, almost-32 bit (shoutout to my IIcx), and 32 bit clean), PowerPC macs, Intel 32 bit macs, Intel 64 bit macs (with and without the T2 security chip), and I\u2019d be a total slacker if I didn\u2019t hack at least a little bit on an ARM64 mac.<\/p>\n<p>Q: <em>Why is Apple spying on us?<\/em><\/p>\n<p>A: I don\u2019t believe that this was explicitly designed as telemetry, but it happens to serve insanely well for that purpose. The simple (assume no malice) explanation is that this is part of Apple\u2019s efforts to prevent malware and ensure platform security on macOS. Additionally, the OCSP traffic that macOS generates is not encrypted, which makes it <em>perfect<\/em> for military surveillance operations (which passively monitor all major ISPs and network backbones) to use it for the <em>purpose<\/em> of telemetry, whether Apple <em>intended<\/em> that when designing the feature or not.<\/p>\n<p>However: Apple recently backdoored iMessage\u2019s cryptography with an iOS update that introduced iCloud Backup, and then <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/article\/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive\/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT\">didn\u2019t fix it so the FBI could continue to read all the data on your phone<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>As Goldfinger\u2019s famous saying goes: <em>\u201cOnce is happenstance. Twice is coincidence. The third time it\u2019s enemy action.\u201d<\/em> There is a finite and small number of times Apple (who employs many absolute stone-cold cryptography <em>wizards<\/em>) can say \u201coops sorry it was an accident\u201d that their software transmitted plaintext or encryption keys <em>off of the device and to the network\/Apple<\/em> and remain credible in their explanations.<\/p>\n<p>The last time I reported an issue to Apple involving the transmission of plaintext across the network back in 2005, <a href=\"https:\/\/nvd.nist.gov\/vuln\/detail\/CVE-2015-3774\">they fixed it promptly<\/a>, and that was only for dictionary word lookups. Shortly thereafter they introduced <a href=\"https:\/\/developer.apple.com\/documentation\/bundleresources\/information_property_list\/nsapptransportsecurity\">App Transport Security<\/a> to help third-party app developers stop fucking up their use of network crypto, and made it way more difficult for those same app developers to make unencrypted requests in App Store apps. It\u2019s quite strange to me to see Apple making OCSP requests unencrypted, even if that is the industry default.<\/p>\n<p>If Apple truly cares about user privacy, they should be looking long and hard at every single packet that comes out of a mac on a fresh install before they release a new OS. We are. The longer that they don\u2019t, the less credible their claims about respecting user privacy will become.<\/p>\n<p>Q: <em>Why are you crying wolf? Don\u2019t you know that OCSP is just to prevent malware and keep the OS secure and isn\u2019t meant as telemetry?<\/em><\/p>\n<p>A: The side effect is that it <em>functions as telemetry<\/em>, regardless of what the original intent of OCSP is or was. Additionally, even though the OCSP responses are signed, it\u2019s borderline negligent that the OCSP requests themselves aren\u2019t encrypted, allowing anyone on the network (which includes the US military intelligence community) to see what apps you\u2019re launching and when.<\/p>\n<p>Many things function as telemetry, even when not originally intended as so. The intelligence services that spy on everyone they can take advantage of this when and where it occurs, regardless of designer intent.<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s not worth putting everyone in a society under constant surveillance to defeat, for example, violent terrorism, and it\u2019s not worth putting everyone on a platform under the same surveillance to defeat malware. You throw out the baby with the bathwater when, in your effort to produce a secure platform, you produce a platform that is <em>inherently insecure<\/em> due to a lack of privacy.<\/p>\n<p>Q: <em>They backdoored iMessage\u2019s end-to-end encryption?! WTF?!<\/em><\/p>\n<p>A: Yup. More technical details in my HN comments <a href=\"https:\/\/news.ycombinator.com\/item?id=25078317\">here<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/news.ycombinator.com\/item?id=25078388\">here<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>TL;DR: They even say as much on their website; from <a href=\"https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/HT202303\">https:\/\/support.apple.com\/en-us\/HT202303<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Messages in iCloud also uses end-to-end encryption. <strong>If you have iCloud Backup turned on, your backup includes a copy of the key protecting your Messages.<\/strong> This ensures you can recover your Messages if you lose access to iCloud Keychain and your trusted devices. When you turn off iCloud Backup, a new key is generated on your device to protect future messages and isn\u2019t stored by Apple.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>(emphasis mine)<\/p>\n<p>Note that iCloud Backup itself is <em>not<\/em> end-to-end encrypted, which is what results in the iMessage key escrow issue that backdoors the end-to-end encryption of iMessage. There\u2019s a section on that webpage that lists the stuff that <em>is<\/em> end-to-end encrypted, and iCloud Backup ain\u2019t in there.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/sneak.berlin\/20200604\/if-zoom-is-wrong-so-is-apple\/\">Neither are your iCloud photos.<\/a> Apple sysadmins (and the US military and feds) can <a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/XEVlyP4_11M?t=1493\">totally see all your nudes<\/a> in iCloud or iMessage.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"further-reading\">Further Reading<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/developer.apple.com\/videos\/play\/wwdc2020\/10686\/\">https:\/\/developer.apple.com\/videos\/play\/wwdc2020\/10686\/<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/lapcatsoftware.com\/articles\/ocsp.html\">https:\/\/lapcatsoftware.com\/articles\/ocsp.html<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p class=\"excerpt\">Jeffrey\u00a0Paul ha scritto \u00abYour Computer Isn&#8217;t Yours\u00bb esordendo con It\u2019s here. It happened. Did you notice? I\u2019m speaking, of course, of the world that Richard Stallman predicted in 1997. Si riferiva a \u00abIl diritto a leggere\u00bb. Che era un racconto di fantascienza, ma si sta concretizzando molto molto velocemente. Evitate i prodotti Apple!<\/p>\n<p class=\"more-link-p\"><a class=\"more-link\" href=\"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/2020\/11\/14\/il-tuo-computer-non-e-tuo\/\">Read more &rarr;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"activitypub_content_warning":"","activitypub_content_visibility":"","activitypub_max_image_attachments":4,"activitypub_interaction_policy_quote":"anyone","activitypub_status":"","footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7740","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-senza-categoria"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p6daft-20Q","jetpack-related-posts":[{"id":9478,"url":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/2022\/07\/07\/scoperte-2\/","url_meta":{"origin":7740,"position":0},"title":"Scoperte","author":"Paolo Redaelli","date":"2022-07-07","format":"link","excerpt":"Scoperta del giorno: LibreOffice Writer on rollApp Il tuo elaboratore di testi gratuito per ogni tipo di documento nel cloud. Ottimizzato specificamente per il tuo dispositivo. Provalo! Non \u00e8 il mio genere ma \u00e8 molto buono sapere che c'\u00e8!","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Software&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Software","link":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/category\/software\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2022\/07\/libreoffice-on-rollapp.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2022\/07\/libreoffice-on-rollapp.webp?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2022\/07\/libreoffice-on-rollapp.webp?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2022\/07\/libreoffice-on-rollapp.webp?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x"},"classes":[]},{"id":5580,"url":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/2019\/05\/17\/molto-meglio\/","url_meta":{"origin":7740,"position":1},"title":"Molto meglio","author":"Paolo Redaelli","date":"2019-05-17","format":false,"excerpt":"Dai un'occhiata al mio risultato Speedtest! Quanto \u00e8 veloce il tuo internet? https:\/\/www.speedtest.net\/my-result\/a\/4948071090 Tiscali Fiber to the cabinet.","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Senza categoria&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Senza categoria","link":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/category\/senza-categoria\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2019\/05\/screenshot_20190517-184457159922998.png?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200},"classes":[]},{"id":8426,"url":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/2021\/05\/20\/il-tuo-computer-non-e-tuo-aggiornamento\/","url_meta":{"origin":7740,"position":2},"title":"Il tuo computer non \u00e8 tuo (aggiornamento)","author":"Paolo Redaelli","date":"2021-05-20","format":false,"excerpt":"Jeffrey\u00a0Paul ha aggiornato l'articolo che avevo citato a novembre ne \u00abIl tuo computer non \u00e8 tuo\u00bb. Mi piacerebbe tradurlo, ma non sono un bravo traduttore e tempo ne ho pochissimo. Quasi quasi provo ad usare DeepL. Your Computer Isn't Yours 12 November 2020 ( 3897 words, approximately 21 minutes reading\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Apple&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Apple","link":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/category\/apple\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]},{"id":6992,"url":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/2020\/04\/01\/live-streaming-su-youtube-tutorial-dirette-nel-youtube-studio\/","url_meta":{"origin":7740,"position":3},"title":"Live Streaming su YouTube \u2013 Tutorial Dirette nel YouTube Studio","author":"Paolo Redaelli","date":"2020-04-01","format":"link","excerpt":"Vuoi fare una diretta su YouTube? In questo tutorial ti guido nelle impostazioni del Live Streaming nel Youtube Studio per iniziare a fare dirette. Live Streaming su YouTube \u2013 Tutorial Dirette nel YouTube Studio Che \u00e8 esattamente quel che ho fatto all'inizio. Poi ci ho ricamato sopra con i telefoni\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Senza categoria&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Senza categoria","link":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/category\/senza-categoria\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2020\/04\/Window_e_Dashboard_canale_-_YouTube_Studio_e_Live_Streaming_YouTube.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2020\/04\/Window_e_Dashboard_canale_-_YouTube_Studio_e_Live_Streaming_YouTube.jpg?resize=350%2C200&ssl=1 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2020\/04\/Window_e_Dashboard_canale_-_YouTube_Studio_e_Live_Streaming_YouTube.jpg?resize=525%2C300&ssl=1 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2020\/04\/Window_e_Dashboard_canale_-_YouTube_Studio_e_Live_Streaming_YouTube.jpg?resize=700%2C400&ssl=1 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2020\/04\/Window_e_Dashboard_canale_-_YouTube_Studio_e_Live_Streaming_YouTube.jpg?resize=1050%2C600&ssl=1 3x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2020\/04\/Window_e_Dashboard_canale_-_YouTube_Studio_e_Live_Streaming_YouTube.jpg?resize=1400%2C800&ssl=1 4x"},"classes":[]},{"id":14061,"url":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/2025\/10\/04\/chatcontrol-daelendum-est\/","url_meta":{"origin":7740,"position":4},"title":"Chatcontrol d\u00e6lendum est!","author":"Paolo Redaelli","date":"2025-10-04","format":false,"excerpt":"https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/p\/DPYKO2miDJE\/?e=5754b086-d51c-4747-bd56-50a8584d0cc3&g=5 Raramente condivido materiale trovato su Instagram, ma questo merita. l 14 ottobre l Unione Europea voter\u00e0 il cosiddetto Chat Control una norma che potrebbe cambiare per sempre il concetto di privacy digitale. Ufficialmente nasce con un intento sacrosanto combattere la pedopornografia online ma dietro questa battaglia giusta rischia di\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Ethics&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Ethics","link":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/category\/ethics\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2025\/10\/angelogrecoofficial-20251004_083645-2583813385.webp?resize=350%2C200","width":350,"height":200,"srcset":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2025\/10\/angelogrecoofficial-20251004_083645-2583813385.webp?resize=350%2C200 1x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2025\/10\/angelogrecoofficial-20251004_083645-2583813385.webp?resize=525%2C300 1.5x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2025\/10\/angelogrecoofficial-20251004_083645-2583813385.webp?resize=700%2C400 2x, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2025\/10\/angelogrecoofficial-20251004_083645-2583813385.webp?resize=1050%2C600 3x"},"classes":[]},{"id":5182,"url":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/2019\/02\/09\/elfa-1-0-la-fattura-elettronica-per-le-ppaa-open-web-solutions-gis-python-development\/","url_meta":{"origin":7740,"position":5},"title":"ElFa 1.0: la fattura elettronica per le PPAA | Open Web Solutions, GIS &#038; Python Development","author":"Paolo Redaelli","date":"2019-02-09","format":false,"excerpt":"Ho finalmente rilasciato con licenza di software libero ElFa 1.0: un piccolo programma per compilare le fatture elettroniche in formato XML, che dal giugno scorso sono obbligatorie per molte pubbliche amministrazioni italiane. Come utilizzare ElFa ElFa consiste in una applicazione web in HTML5, non interagisce in alcun modo con la\u2026","rel":"","context":"In &quot;Senza categoria&quot;","block_context":{"text":"Senza categoria","link":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/category\/senza-categoria\/"},"img":{"alt_text":"","src":"","width":0,"height":0},"classes":[]}],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7740","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7740"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7740\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7740"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7740"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/monodes.com\/predaelli\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7740"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}